My article The Ghazalian response to deniers of causality led to some interesting discussions on Facebook . One of the contentions raised relate to a certain view of time, known as the B-theory of time, which imagines the universe as a 4-D space-time block. Matter/energy is distributed across this space-time continuum and a single point in space-time, an “event”, can be described by assigning it coordinates e.g. x, y, z, t; and the next “event” as x1, y1, z1, t1. The relevant issue for our purposes that arises from such a conception of space-time is that it makes time itself tenseless. Just as a point in space is said to be in the north or south relative to another point, moments in time are also said to be in the past, present or future relative to other moments. But time itself, according to this theory, exists tenselessly.
Because events are distributed tenselessly across this space-time continuum, some atheists use this theory to argue that there is no “first moment” of existence, so it would really be meaningless to say that the universe “began to exist”. This claim supposedly poses a challenge to the “Kalam” argument which holds that the universe has a beginning.
Philosopher William Lane Craig deals with this contention by supporting the A-theory of time and refuting the B-theory. However, I don’t think this approach is necessary. Simply clarifying some of the metaphysical assumptions underpinning the Kalam argument should suffice, especially the ontological categories, namely, necessary, possible and absurd/impossible. The A or B theory does not jeopardise these ontological categories in the least bit and hence the “kalam” argument flows nicely through to its conclusion regardless of either of these theories of time. For example, even if we understand time according to the B-theory of time, it is still possible for one to say that X did not exist at t0, but it did so at t1, i.e. it “began to exist”.
The below Facebook discussion happened a few years ago, and I have aways wanted to write an article on the criticisms of kalam arising out of the B-theory of time since then. However, I have decided to post the original discussion with slight modifications because I think it touches on a number of important topics (albeit briefly), not just the B-theory of time, and the back-and-forth nature of the engagement perhaps makes for a more interesting read rather than an article on such a dry and dense topic. I have changed the name of the questioner to HM. Here’s the conversation:
HM:
All observed instances of causation involve things coming form preexisting material. The article does not even begin to address the more forceful objection that creation out of nothing is metaphysically absurd and that there is no contradiction in saying the universe is self-contained such that it just exists.
Furthermore, it seems to me that it could simply be denied that it is appropriate to describe the universe as an entity which “pops into existence” or which “begins to exist” even if it is true that the universe is temporally finite. Suppose we think of the universe as a distribution of properties over an at-least-four-dimensional finite manifold.Then it could surely turn out to be the case that there is nothing which begins to exist which does not have a cause, and yet that the universe–which is not itself an entity in time–does not begin to exist (and hence does not need a cause to explain how it “pops into existence”). The article also assumes a position in the philosophy of time called presentism which most philosophers reject. Most philosophers and physicists accept the eternalist view of the universe I have outlined.
My reply:
Perhaps my article assumes something similar to what is probably called the A theory of time although I don’t adopt any particular “theory” of time. Whether most philosophers agree or not is inconsequential. I tried to present Ghazali’s view and he presents a coherent and powerful argument while being very aware and frank about his metaphysical presuppositions.
Even if we hold the universe to be a 4 dimensional space-time block, it still remains finite. If it is finite, then it is not necessary. If it is not necessary and still in existence, it is contingent/possible. If it is contingent/possible, it is created. That’s in brief. But you need to understand the fundamental ontological and epistemological premises of Muslim theologians in order to be able to appreciate it.
HM:
Thanks for your response.
I agree the opinions of philosophers or physicists are irrelevant to the question of truth but our best empirical theories support a 4D conception of nature. Relativistic effects such as length contraction, time dilation etc are not possible in a 3D world and the A-theory assumes an absolute reference frame which relativity has falsified and/or shown is ad hoc.
Re: contingency. Both the theist and naturalist claim there there exists at least one brute contingent fact. One could just as well ask al-Ghazali why God has the particular properties he has (eg timeless as opposed to temporal or why he has these particular creative dispositions rather than others). One can imagine an entirely different host of divine attributes, which theologians frequently debate.
Hence I don’t find the whole contingent/necessary distinction helpful. It can apply to anything really.
Also you didn’t address my point about creation out of nothing.
Jazakallah
Uthman Badar:
It seems you misunderstand the argument from contingency. The existence of God and His properties are not asserted randomly. Nor are they supposed or imagined. They are proven from observed phenomena. Contingency in the material world is observed. That is sufficient to prove the existence of a necessary being, because contingent beings cannot explain their existence. Being necessary implies timelessness directly, as temporality is a type of contingency.
HM:
There is nothing necessary about absolute divine timelessness. Some philosophers like Nicolas Wolterstoff and William Lane Craig have defended the idea of divine temporality and a hybrid of temporality and timelessness respectively. The fact that such models of God’s relationship to time are even conceivable means and there is nothing necessary about any of them. The fact that we can logically conceive of God having completely different creative dispositions was not addressed from my previous comment. What explains why this particular universe was willed to exist rather than another? This is a contingent fact about God.
Since everything that exists or can exist is contingent, it follows that the notion of a necessary being is not coherent and a timeless mind by definition is non-functional.
I think one should be cautious with such philosophical syllogisms, while they seem compelling they are riddled with unreasonable assumptions like the A-theory of time which I discussed with Br. Shafiul or the possibility of creation ex nihilo.
Thank you for your time.
My reply:
Thanks Br HM for your comments. Here are a few quick points.
Re: time:
1. As a humble creation my lived experience of time is that it is “passing”. I’m not God, you know, such that past, present and future are all the same to me. So if you want to be “empirical” then one might as well ask why should we prefer the B theory over our direct experience merely to accommodate your “empirical theories” which are generalisations/abstractions at best in order to construct a simplified model of a complex universe. I don’t find it a compelling enough reason. If you’re a believer in relativity and find B-theory useful, up to you. But it’s far-fetched to call the A-theory of time an “unreasonable assumption”.
2. A or B theory of time is irrelevant to our discussion on creation. These are merely ways of conceptualising space/time which do not negate the fact of their finitude. Now it seems you accept the universe is temporally finite, yet you don’t accept that it “began to exist”. For me that’s a contradiction of terms but I will be a bit more generous. I can understand (although I don’t agree) why you would have difficulty imagining the universe “beginning to exist” given you seem very strict on the b-theory of time. So let’s put it another way. Just as you accept the finitude of time without having to imagine a “first instance” of time, why can’t you accept the creation of the universe without having to imagine it “popping into existence”? Quite like space you know. Because north and south are merely relative does not mean they were not created. Likewise, if you want to imagine past, present and future as relative, that does not necessitate that you reject the fact of their creation. The universe is created because it’s finite. A, B, C, D etc. conceptions of time/space haven’t got anything to do with it.
3. Kalam theologians do seem to assume something like an A theory but unlike what you said their argument does not “hinge” on it. They argue for a Necessary Being because the universe is contingent.
Re: necessity/contingency:
I really don’t have much to say if you make statements like “There is nothing necessary about absolute divine timelessness.” Perhaps you haven’t understood Ghazali’s argument. Don’t judge Ghazali by what you read of Craig. Craig adds his own twist to what he calls the “Kalam cosmological argument” while contradicting some fundamental premises of Kalam theologians. E.g. He attributes changeability to God. E.g. He says God enters time when He creates. He really ruins the Kalam argument. According to the likes of Ghazali anything that exists in time (regardless of A or B theory) is given to change, and hence contingent.
The 3 ontological categories that the Ash’aris take to be a given are necessity, contingency and absurdity/impossibility (Mustaheel). A temporal god is absurd/impossible. I really don’t know how you can make statements like:
“The fact that such models of God’s relationship to time are even conceivable means and there is nothing necessary about any of them.”
Just because philosophers have different conceptions of God does not automatically make Him/His attributes contingent.
Also the fact that God chose to create a contingent universe does not entail that His attribute of Will itself be contingent. In fact, if the universe was not contingent but necessary, then God’s attribute of Will, Power and Knowledge wouldn’t make sense. In fact you wouldn’t need a Creator at all!
It’s one thing to appreciate an argument yet disagree. But it seems to me you don’t fully understand/appreciate the Ash’ari view. Again, as I said, don’t read Craig to understand Ghazali (and why would you cite Craig anyway – he adopts the A theory of time Lol!).
Re: Creation ex-nihilo:
You said, “All observed instances of causation involve things coming form preexisting material. The article does not even begin to address the more forceful objection that creation out of nothing is metaphysically absurd and that there is no contradiction in saying the universe is self-contained such that it just exists.”
If you want to be too empiricist about “observed instances of causation” you can barely make any absolute claim about causality. All you can say is X happens and Y happens. You can’t say X happens because of Y in an absolute sense. At most, all you can claim is that we have not yet observed things coming into existence from nothing. But to go from there and make a metaphysical claim that creation from nothingness is “metaphysically absurd” is a leap of faith!
If you’re going to be big on empirical observation, at least stick within the range of conclusions that the parameters of your epistemology allow.
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Qur'anic Reflections 
Jazakallah khair for this post, brother.
Though there are a couple of questions I always had with these arguments. The first, is how can we understand God being unchanged and not bound by time, yet he wills and acts? Aren’t actions considered as a change bound by time, and implies that at one point something was not being done and then it was done.
The second is a little bit related. How can we understand the act of creation if we take time itself being created and part of the universe? There isn’t a point “before” time, as an act of creation would imply, because there isn’t time there in the first place.
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Wa iyyaakum.
Good questions and I think both these questions have been answered in some detail by our scholars, e.g. in Incoherence of the Philosophers by Imam Ghazali. It’d be difficult to summarise his main arguments in such a short space but, if you want to have a read, I’d recommend trying to find a qualified scholar to read it with.
However, personally, I find the most effective way to deal with this kind of discussion is to understand what we can and cannot know about God. We need to distinguish between two things:
1. God’s existence
2. God’s essence (what is He like?)
We can affirm the first, i.e. God exists, from rational evidence, and also from our fitrah. Our mind can comprehend the things we observe in the universe, and by reflecting on these limited things we can conclude the necessity of an eternal Creator.
However, with regards to the second i.e. what is God like, the mind can never comprehend His essence because He is utterly dissimilar to anything that we have ever experienced and that we can ever possibly imagine. As Imam Tahawi says, “Thoughts cannot reach Him, and minds cannot grasp Him.”
One of my teachers gave me this example to understand this point. He asked the class if we could imagine a creature that we had never seen before? The answer was “yes”. You could put together different parts of different creatures/things you’ve seen in your life and come up with a new creature that you’ve never seen before (just consider all the imaginary cartoon characters, for example).
However, he then asked if we could imagine a completely new and different colour that we had never seen before? At this point, my mind completely stopped. I could imagine different combinations or shades of colours that I’ve already seen, but not a colour that is completely different to anything I’ve ever witnessed before.
The reason for the inability of the mind to imagine a completely different colour is due to the fact that our imagination, and the meanings that we express in our language, are limited to our experience.
And because God lies completely beyond the universe, it is utterly impossible for the mind to even remotely grasp what God is like, including how He acts and wills.
So, with regards to your first question, yes we as human beings can only imagine actions as being bound by time. Therefore when we talk about God’s will and actions, our imagination and our language force us to factor in the concept of time. Yet, it is merely the result of the limits of our mind. Therefore, it is best to avoid trying to rationalise something that lies beyond the limits of the mind.
However, this is different to the rational arguments for God’s existence (as opposed to His essence), because the arguments use as proof observed phenomena, such as the limits and changes in the universe that the mind can comprehend.
The above points are related to your second question as well. However, I will just add the following:
True, there is no “before” before time. However, what we mean by “before” is not a temporal “before”. When theologians say that the universe did not exist “before” and then came into existence, they are merely referring to the fact that the universe had a first moment of existence (if B-theorists have a problem with “a first moment of existence”, we can just say: the earliest moment in time at which the universe is bounded off in the earlier-than direction).
When it comes to God and His actions, perhaps a better choice of word (though not completely accurate, due to the limits of our language) would be “beyond”. God exists beyond time and space. When scientists like Stephen Hawkings say that asking what came before the Big Bang is like asking what lies south of the South Pole because there is no notion of time to refer to, they actually provide a wrong analogy. Asking what is south of the South Pole still restricts the question within the dimensions of space. The question is what lies beyond space? Likewise, we’re not asking what existed in time before time existed. That would obviously be a self-contradictory question. We’re rather asking, “What exists outside, independent of and beyond time?”
In fact, the B-theory of time in itself is a good example for us. It’s a bit hard to grasp as we don’t experience time that way. However, it’s probably useful in explaining certain phenomena. So, theoretically it is accepted by scientists despite the contradiction with our direct experience of time and the difficulty of our imagination to grasp it. Now, if we, as mere humans, can imagine time as tenseless, which would mean that we exist in a realm where “before” and “after” don’t have any absolute meaning, what about God? Should those who make claims like Stephen Hawkings as stated above also not then accept the possibility of a Being beyond time despite there not being any concept of a “before” before time?
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